Abstract. Competition has been argued to erode socially responsible behavior on markets, suggesting that allowing cartel agreements among firms may promote public interest objectives. We test this idea in a laboratory experiment. Participants playing the role of firms choose between offering a 'fair' and an 'unfair' good to a consumer participant. When the unfair good is traded, a negative externality is imposed on a third party. We vary whether or not the firms are allowed to coordinate on the type of good they sell. We find that the opportunity to coordinate has no significant impact on the fraction of fair goods traded on the market, but polarizes: more of the same good, fair or unfair, is offered. Consumer surplus and producer surplus are not affected on average. Consistently with theory, firms having strong third-party preferences tend to coordinate on both offering the fair good. Our results suggest that both consumer and managerial values are a more important driver of socially responsible behavior than opportunities for firms to coordinate their corporate social responsibility activities.
Introduction
Socially responsible behavior is an alternative way to curb negative externalities ranging from pollution to poor labor conditions and resource depletion, where markets and government fail (Bénabou and Tirole, 2010) . 1 Laboratory evidence by Falk and Szech (2013) and Bartling et al. (2015) supports this notion, but find no significant effect of increased competition. 2 In fact, corporate social responsibility (CSR) may be negatively affected by fierce competition (Shleifer, 2004) . Several empirical studies point in this direction. In the laboratory, Roth et al. (1991) find that increased competition leads to fewer 'fair' outcomes. Cai and Liu (2009) report that competition has a positive impact on corporate tax avoidance in China. Brekke et al. (2017) and Markussen and Røed (2017) observe that general practitioners in Norway are more lenient gatekeepers, the more competitive is the market for their services.
These findings suggest that relaxing competition between firms by allowing them to make agreements regarding CSR may be welfare enhancing. In U.S. antitrust enforcement, public interest considerations are not recognized in the statutes. 3 However, in the European competition practice they are taking prominence. In CECED (1999) , the European Commission exempted a horizontal agreement amongst producers of kitchen compliances to discontinue its cheapest line of washing machines and dishwashers from cartel law, under Article 101(3), on the argument that it would save on electricity and water use to environmental benefit. In Several Member State competition agencies have since considered to allow cartels for the compensating benefits their agreements were claimed to have for sustainable production, including between electricity producers, shrimp fishermen and poultry farmers. 4 Recently, the European Parliament called for an overhaul of the competition rules to include "sustainability factors" such as fair trade and environmental standards. 5 In contrast, allowing firms to make agreements regarding CSR may also induce them to do less of it. Flammer (2015) finds empirical evidence for this and Schinkel and Spiegel (2017) establish theoretically that coordination diminishes incentives to invest in CSR. An illustrative case is an international cartel of lightbulb producers, including General Electric, Osram, and Philips, reducing the lifetime of lightbulbs in the 1920s. The advance of public goods by private 1 Bénabou and Tirole (2010) discuss three potential reasons why firms may internalize negative externalities: (1) 'doing well by doing good', (2) delegated philanthropy, and (3) insider-initiated corporate philanthropy. The latter reason resonates with the 'upper echelons perspective' from the business literature, which stipulates that managers' decision making is influenced by their own values (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) . The empirical literature indeed identifies a strong link between managers' values and their strategic decision making (Agle et al., 1999; Marquis and Lee, 2013; Chin et al., 2013; Filistrucchi and Prüfer, 2019) . In the conclusion, we elaborate further on this literature. 2 Elfenbein and McManus (2010) and Soetevent et al. (2016) present evidence that consumers also internalize positive externalities in that they pay more for charity-linked products. 3 In National Society of Professional Engineers, the Supreme Court held in a matter concerning quality standards that even if competition would conflict with professional standards, that would be a matter of regulation, and "... not a reason, cognizable under the Sherman Act, for doing away with competition," (National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States 435 U.S. 679, 1978) . See also Werden (2014) . 4 See Schinkel and Spiegel (2017) for an extensive discussion. The Netherlands competition authority has been a forerunner in the assessment of the 'sustainability defense'. 5 Competition Policy International, EU: MEPs demands fundamental overhaul of competition policy, February 4, 2019. cartels can only be expected if the freeriding problem can be overcome. 6 Allowing coordination furthermore carries a risk of facilitating collusion on prices, quality, production capacity, and R&D. 7 In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to address the question to what extent firms coordinating their CSR strategies is welfare improving. We study the effect of coordination on socially responsible behavior using a variant of Bartling et al.'s (2015) framework. Our hypotheses are based on a standard vertical product differentiation model. Two firms and a continuum of consumers interact in a three-stage game that we label 'the market game'. In the first stage of the market game, the firms can choose between offering a 'fair' and an 'unfair' good. In the second stage, both firms post a price. In the third stage, consumers can choose between the two offers. When the unfair good is traded, a negative externality is imposed on a third party. The firms and the consumers vary in the extent to which they 'care' about this externality. To study CSR coordination, we examine the impact of adding a coordination stage before the market game in which firms can reach a horizontal agreement regarding the kind of good each firm will offer in the first stage of the market game. They can do so on the basis of an alternating-offers negotiation. We test this model using three laboratory experiments.
There is an extensive experimental literature on horizontal agreements between firms. Our paper is different along two dimension. First, we consider agreements concerning product differentiation, while the literature so far has focused mainly on agreements regarding price, quantity, and market entry. 8 An important lesson from the existing literature is that the ability to make agreements makes markets less competitive at the expense of consumers. This motivated us to only allow for minimal coordination. We restrict attention to firms coordinating on only the kind of good offered and limit the way firms can communicate with each other. The second difference between our paper and the existing experimental literature on collusion is that we have human consumers on the demand side instead of a simulated aggregate demand function. 9 This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we examine the theoretical properties of the market game. In a baseline setting in which neither firm cares about the negative externality, the coordination stage allows them to profitably differentiate their goods, which negatively affects consumer surplus. In contrast, if a fraction of the firms cares about the externality, the opportunity to coordinate may result in less product variety, i.e., it is more likely that both firms offer the same kind of good, fair or unfair. Consumer surplus increases if firms do so. We also observe that coordination on reduced product variety could be implemented using a simpler coordination stage, i.e., one in which firms can vote for both selling the fair good.
In Section 3, we present our baseline experiment. It closely follows the experimental paradigm in Bartling et al. (2015) , in that the third party suffering from a negative externality in the case that the unfair good is traded is a participant in the laboratory. We replace the continuum of consumers by one consumer whose preference for the externality is not revealed to the firms. Our main finding is that the opportunity to coordinate on fair production has no significant impact on the fraction of fair goods traded on the market. However, the firms do coordinate on offering more the same good (fair or unfair), thus decreasing product variety in our experimental markets. That is, the fraction of markets where only fair goods are offered increases, but so does that of only unfair goods. Average market prices, consumer surplus, and producer surplus are also unaffected. Moreover, we observe that market interaction does not erode socially responsible behavior of consumers. We conclude that allowing firms to coordinate on the type of good offered to the consumers does not increase socially responsible outcomes on average in our experimental framework. Instead both consumer and managerial values are a more important driver of socially responsible behavior.
Sections 4 and 5 contain results from two additional experiments that we ran to test for the robustness of our findings. In the second experiment, we replace the third party in the lab by 'the world' in that we refrained from buying carbon-emission compensation certificates when the unfair good was traded. In the third experiment, we used the same framework as in the first one, with the exception that we employed the coordination mechanism in which firms can vote for both selling the fair good. It is arguably more likely that competition authorities exempt such coordination from anti-cartel law than the firms coordinating on at least one of them offering an unfair good. With some notable exceptions, the findings in both additional experiments are qualitatively in line with the ones in the baseline experiment. Section 6 concludes.
The market game
Consider a market consisting of two firms and a continuum of consumers. The firms and the consumers interact in the following three-stage game ('the market game').
1. The firms simultaneously and independently choose whether to produce the fair or the unfair good. The firms' decisions become common knowledge. 2. The firms simultaneously and independently set a price from the set 0, , 2 , … , where 0 is the smallest currency unit. 3. Consumers can buy at most one of the goods offered in the market. They can also decide not to buy at all.
Consumers are characterized by a parameter that measure how much additional utility they obtain when buying the fair good compared to buying the unfair good. We assume that is uniformly distributed over the interval 0, , 0. A consumer type 's utility from buying the [un]fair good at price equals , , , , where is the good's consumption value. A consumer's utility when not buying equals 0. The interpretation is that trade of the unfair good imposes a negative externality on a third party which decreases consumer type 's utility by . In other words, is the consumer's 'moral costs' of buying the unfair good. The fair good is 'socially responsible' in that it does not result in a negative externality. . We assume to guarantee that in equilibrium, all consumers buy a good.
We assume that , , and are multiples of 3 and that is 'small'. Firm is characterized by a parameter , 1,2, which could be interpreted as the extent to which firm incorporates the negative externality imposed by the unfair good being sold into its profit function, i.e., 1 the unfair good is traded if firm does not sell if firm sells the fair good at price if firm sells the unfair good at price where 1 denotes the indicator function of an event . The parameters and are naturally interpreted as consumer and managerial values respectively.
We now describe our main theoretical findings at an intuitive level. The formal results are in the appendix. First consider the case 0, i.e., where neither firm cares about the negative externality. The market game has a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which both firms randomize over offering the fair good and the unfair good (Proposition 1 in the appendix). Obviously, the market game has asymmetric equilibria as well, in which the two firms produce different kinds of goods. The firms might have to coordinate to reach such equilibrium outcome. Such coordination could be facilitated if firms interact in a coordination stage before playing the market game.
We analyze the following coordination stage. One firm is randomly chosen to become the first proposer. This firm makes a proposal that states the kind of good each firm will offer. After observing the proposal, the other firm can accept the proposal or reject it. When it rejects the proposal, it can make a counterproposal. The first firm can also accept or reject the proposal. Accepted proposals are implemented accordingly after which the second stage of the market game starts. If both proposals are rejected, the two firms interact in the complete market game. The label the market game cum coordination stage the extended market game. Comparing the outcomes between the market game and the extended market game allows us to build hypotheses regarding the effect of CSR coordination that we test in our experiments.
We find that in the extended market game, the firms differentiate their goods in that one firm offers the fair good and the other the unfair good (Proposition 2). As a result, CSR coordination yields more product differentiation. The intuition is that product differentiation allows firms to increase their profits compared to the situation that both offer the same good, which happens with positive probability in the equilibrium of the market game. We find that CSR coordination has an ambiguous effect on the probability that the fair good is traded (Examples 1 and 2). Moreover, while firms benefit from CSR coordination, the effect of CSR coordination on consumer surplus is unambiguously negative (Proposition 3). The increased prices are not compensated by the fact that they can always choose between a fair and an unfair product.
Next, we study a setting where 0 with strictly positive probability, i.e., the case of firms internalizing the negative externality. Under some conditions, the market game has a separating equilibrium in which firm offers the [un] fair good if 0 [ 0] (Proposition 4). So, there is a positive correlation between and the likelihood that firm offers the fair good. Under the same conditions, CSR coordination yields more fair trade (Proposition 5). The reason is that the coordination stage in the extended market game allows type-0 firms to differentiate their goods when both are present while any other realization of types results in the same outcome in the two games.
CSR coordination may also allow firms for which 0 to coordinate on an outcome where both offer the fair good (Propositions 6 and 7). Notice that such outcome could also be implemented in a simpler coordination stage in which firms can vote for both selling the fair good. If, and only if, both firms decide to vote in favor of offering the fair good, they will offer the fair good. Otherwise, the firms interact in the market game. Clearly, in the extended market game, the fair good is traded more often than in the original market game. Consumers are worse off because the additional amount they pay for the fair good compared to the unfair good is higher than the additional utility they obtain from buying it. We also present parameters for which CSR coordination results in less product differentiation, i.e., it is more likely that both firms offer the same kind of good, fair or unfair (Example 3). In this case, consumers benefit from CSR coordination.
Experiment 1: Baseline Experiment
In the previous section, we observed that theoretically, CSR coordination has ambiguous effects on the probability that the fair good is traded, product differentiation, and consumer surplus. In a setting where neither firm internalizes the externality, firms might manage to coordinate on profitably differentiating their goods. However if some firms internalize the externality, CSR coordination more frequently results in the same kind of good being offered, fair or unfair. Such coordination could be implemented using a simpler coordination stage, e.g., one in which firms can vote for both selling the fair good. Only in a setting where some firms internalize the externality, consumers can benefit from firms being able to coordinate the kinds of good they offer identified.
We ran three experiments to identify conditions under which these theoretical results are empirically relevant. The three experiments were conducted at the CREED laboratory of the University of Amsterdam (UvA). They were computerized and programmed in PHP/mySQL. We used control questions to test the participants' understanding of the instructions. 10 Payoffs in the experiments were denominated in 'francs'. The exchange rate was 1 euro for 10 francs. Each session lasted between 60 and 90 minutes.
Design and procedures Experiment 1
In the first experiment, 136 students of a mandatory Economics course in the PPLE (Politics, Psychology, Law and Economics) bachelor of the UvA participated. The participants did not receive a show-up fee. Their earnings ranged from €0 to €14.90 with an average of €7.70.
At the beginning of a session, participants are informed that the experiment consists of two parts, and that the instructions to each part are distributed at the start of that part. In the first part, we measure participants' 'third-party preferences' on the basis of ten dictator decisions. In the second part, we let participants interact in 24 rounds of the market game using a variant of the experimental paradigm introduced by Bartling et al. (2015) . 11 One of the 10 decisions in the first part or one of the 24 market rounds in the second part is randomly chosen to determine payments at the end of a session. We start by discussing the second part because the third-party preferences measured in the first part have a natural interpretation in view of the parameter choices in second part.
In the second part, participants interact in 24 rounds of the market game. In each round, participants are randomly assigned to groups of four. 12 Two group members play the role of firm, one group member is the consumer, and the remaining group member is the third party that suffers from a negative externality if the unfair good is traded. We use the following parameters: The production costs are 0 for the unfair good and 15 for the fair good. The price set is 0,1,2, … ,100 and the corresponding smallest currency unit equals The experimental design exploits two treatments, that vary in the opportunity for the firms to coordinate on the kind of good sold. In treatment COORDINATION, participants interact in the coordination stage before playing the market game in the same way as in the extended market game described in Section 2. 13 In treatment NO COORDINATION, the participants interact in the market game right away.
After each round, the groups are re-matched within matching groups of eight participants. In the first experiment, 72 [64] participants were assigned to the COORDINATION [NO COORDINATION] treatment resulting in 9 [8] matching groups. The role of firms and consumers is randomly alternated. This is done to foster learning and to make it harder for firms to collude. Role 11 Our experimental framework differs from Bartling et al.'s (2015) in two ways. First of all, in Bartling et al.'s experiments, both the number of firms and the number of consumers is greater than in ours. Second, in Bartling et al.'s design, firms simultaneously decide on the kind of good offered and the price while in ours, firms only decide on the price after observing the kind of good offered by the other firm. We believe our design better resonates with markets in practice as well as the way product differentiation is typically modeled in the industrial organization literature. 12 For statistical reasons, we keep the number of participants in a market as low as possible. Bartling et al. (2017) find no substantial effect of the number of affected third parties on socially responsible market behavior. In Section 4, we report the results of an experiment in which the externalities are arguably more diffused. 13 We choose to restrict communication in this way because free-form communication helps firms to increases prices in the lab (see, e.g., Isaac et al., 1984; Fonseca and Normann, 2012; Gomez-Martinez et al., 2016) .
switching also enlarges the pool where consumers and firms are drawn from, which results in a smoother distribution of consumer types within a matching group than without role switching. We chose to keep the role of third party fixed throughout the second part to discourage participants to collude on only trading the fair good (which maximizes the group's joint payoffs).
In part 1 of the experiment, we measure participants' 'third-party' preferences using a variant of a social preferences test developed by Yang et al. (2016) (see Table 1 ). The participants are randomly assigned into pairs. Each participant makes ten choices between options A and B. Each choice determines the payoffs for both the decision maker and the participant she is paired with (the receiver). If one of the decisions in part 1 is chosen to determine payments at the end of a session, in each pair one of the participants is appointed decision maker and his/her decision for the selected choice is implemented. Notes: The ten decisions between options A and B. ''Yours" refers to the decision maker's payoff and ''Other's" to the receiver's payoff. The final column presents the values of that rationalize a choice of option B for a participant whose utility function is represented by (1). This column was obviously not shown to the participants."
Now, assume that a participant's utility function is given by
where is the own payoff and is the other's payoff. Observe that we have normalized the utility function in such a way that can be interpreted as the highest price difference between the fair good and the unfair good for which the consumer prefers buying the fair good over the unfair good. 14 14 Notice that in all ten options A and B in table 1, the decision maker earns more than the other person. Therefore, the test could also be used to measure in the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model according to which the decision maker's utility is given by , for . Indeed, model (1) is equivalent to the Fehr-Schmidt model for if .
Results Experiment 1
In this section, we present our experimental results. Throughout the paper, when we speak about the effect of CSR coordination, we refer to outcome differences observed between the treatments COORDINATION and NO COORDINATION. In section 3.2.1, we examine whether CSR coordination has an impact on aggregate market outcomes. In section 3.2.2, individual behavior for both consumers and firms is analyzed, and, in particular, linked with the third-party preferences measured in part 1 of the experiment. Lastly, in section 3.2.3. we study whether consumer behavior is consistent with their measured preferences in part 1. This would shed light on whether the market environment affected participants' socially responsible behavior.
Throughout the paper, for the non-parametric analysis we treat re-matching groups of 8 participants (6 participants in Experiment 2) as a single observation. Unless indicated otherwise, the two-sided Mann-Whitney U test is used for non-parametric comparisons between treatments. For the parametric analysis, standard errors are clustered by matching group.
The effect of coordination on aggregate market outcomes
We first examine the effect of coordination possibilities on market outcomes. As the first column in Table 2 shows, the fair good is traded in almost 2/3 of the market interactions for both treatments. There are no significant differences in the proportion of fair goods traded between treatments (p=1.000). 15 Figure 1 , panel a, shows the evolution of the share of fair goods traded over time for both treatments. This figure suggests that the share of fair goods traded is stable over time and that there is no treatment effect. This is confirmed in specification (1) in Table 3 where a time trend is introduced. The coefficients for Treatment and Period are not statistically different from 0. Therefore, we can conclude that allowing firms to coordinate on the type of good offered to the consumers does not increase the fraction of fair goods traded on the market. Our theoretical analysis indicates that the distribution of offers that consumers face may be affected by the introduction of coordination possibilities. In the remainder of this paper, we refer to 'symmetric offers' when firms offer the same kind of good and to 'asymmetric offers' when one firm offers the fair good and the other the unfair good. Table 2 shows that, when introducing coordination possibilities, the fraction of symmetric offers rises (p=0.012). This implies that introducing coordination possibilities among firms increases product homogeneity.
Result 1. CSR coordination does not affect the fraction of fair goods traded on the market.
The evolution of offer types by treatment is represented in Figure 1 , panels b-d and estimated in specifications (2), (3), and (4) in Table 3 . The proportion of asymmetric offers is fairly constant over time and clearly lower when firms have the opportunity to coordinate. The fraction of symmetric fair offers is stable over time when firms can coordinate on the type of good they offer. In the NO COORDINATION treatment, the fraction of symmetric fair offers increases over time, reaching the same proportion quite fast. As a consequence, the share of symmetric fair offers is not significantly different between treatments. The proportion of symmetric unfair offers clearly decreases over time for both treatments. There are slightly more symmetric unfair offers in the COORDINATION treatment than in the NO COORDINATION treatment, but this difference is not statistically significant. We conclude that when firms can coordinate on the type of goods sold, they tend to agree on offering the same good (fair or unfair), 16 increasing product homogeneity in our experimental markets. We now turn to market prices. Even though firms cannot coordinate on price decisions, coordination on the type of good offered might affect prices indirectly. For example, a tendency of firms to agree on symmetric offers causes a decrease on prices according to Bertrand logic. 17 [56%] of the fair/fair [unfair/unfair] offers are accepted while only 35% of the asymmetric offers are accepted). 17 We find evidence for this effect (see specification (3) in Table 5 ).
Result 2. CSR coordination increases the share of symmetric offers.
The opposite situation may also arise. The fact that firms reach an agreement on symmetric fair offers could serve as signal to coordinate on higher prices. 18 (5) and (6) in Table 3 . Figure 2 highlights a clear downward pressure on prices, mainly in the first rounds. Apparently, participants seem to be engaged in a race to the bottom towards marginal cost pricing. All in all, we clearly observe no treatment effect in the average market price for either type of good. Introducing coordination possibilities on the type of goods offered by firms do not affect average market prices for fair and unfair goods.
Comparing market prices between the fair and the unfair good, we can clearly observe that firms and consumers care about the negative externality that may be inflicted to the third party in the lab. This is reflected by the market price premium for fair goods (average price gap between fair and unfair goods). The average market price premium for the fair good is 6.69 in the NO COORDINATION treatment and 7.74 in the COORDINATION treatment. The difference is not statistically significant. So, consistent with the assumptions underlying our theoretical analysis, consumers are willing to pay more for the fair good than for the unfair good. As the production costs for the fair good are 15 higher than for the unfair good, it turns out that firms are also willing to give up some profits to sell the fair good. In fact, firms and buyers approximately share the additional production costs of the fair good as in Bartling et al. (2015) . We conclude that the introduction of coordination possibilities between firms does not affect the share of fair goods traded nor the price at which the fair and the unfair goods are sold. We observe a tendency from firms to coordinate on symmetric offers, increasing product homogeneity in our experimental markets. Still, the firms' ability to coordinate has no significant impact on either consumer surplus or producer surplus. 19
Result 3. CSR coordination does not affect consumer surplus or producer surplus.
Firms' and consumers' individual behavior
Next we turn attention to individual behavior of consumers and firms. In particular, we examine the relation between the third-party preferences measured in part 1 and market behavior in part 2. As said, we measured third-party preferences using the ten choices displayed in Table 1 . The parameter in the utility function in Eq.
(1) measures the highest price difference between the fair good and the unfair good for which the consumer prefers buying the fair good. Under the assumption that participants' decisions are consistent between the market and non-market environments, participants' decisions in part 1 of the experiment allow us to measure . More precisely, the point where participants switch from option A to option B identifies the interval in which lies. 20 For example, if a participant chooses option A in decisions 1-4 and option B from decision 5 onwards then ∈ 17.5, 21.875 . In our statistical analysis, we approximate using the variable Gamma, which is the midpoint of the interval. 21 For firms' third-party preference , we use the same variable, assuming that the extent to which participants care about the third party does not depend on the role played in the experimental markets. Figure 3 plots the cumulative distribution of the switching points in the three experiments. Table 4 reports regressions explaining firms' behavior. All models include the period and Gamma as explanatory variables. Specification (1) models the individual firms' decisions of which type of good to offer using data from both treatments. The results indicate that the greater participants' the more likely they are to offer the fair good when assuming the role of a firm (p=0.000). Moreover, introducing coordination possibilities does not affect the probability of offering the fair good. The likelihood of firms offering the fair good is increasing in time. Specification (2) restricts the analysis to the COORDINATION treatment. Firms reaching an agreement are significantly more likely to offer the fair good (p=0.039). This confirms that firms tend to agree on fair symmetric offers more often than in unfair symmetric offers. 20 With consistent preferences, some consumers may always choose the altruistic option, others would always choose the selfish option, and the rest would switch from the altruistic option to the selfish option at some point and keep choosing the selfish option until the last dictator decision. We refer to other choice patterns as 'inconsistent preferences'. In the three experiments, 25 participants exhibited inconsistent preferences (6.7% of our participants). We excluded these participants' decisions from the analysis requiring third-party preferences. 21 When a participant always chooses the altruistic option we just know that 43.75. If this is the case we defined Gamma= 43.75. This means this participant is willing to give up some payoffs if and only if her payoffs are at least as high as the receiver' payoffs. Specifications (3) and (4) in Table 4 focus on firms' price decisions for the fair good. 22 The price offered for the fair good is not affected by Gamma in either treatment: Our measure for thirdparty preferences in the non-market environment cannot predict the behavior of firms in terms of price decisions for the fair good. Moreover, allowing firms to agree on the type of good offered has no effect on prices. As in actual market prices, the price offered for the fair good is declining over time. In addition, consistent with theory, firms choose a higher price for the fair good when the other firm offers the unfair good. In particular, the price offered for the fair good increases by 2.46 units in the case of asymmetric offers. Finally, from specification (4), we can observe that reaching an agreement in the COORDINATION treatment causes an increase in the price offered for the fair good. In other words, collusion on the type of good offered spill over into the price decisions.
Result 5. Firms offer a higher price for the fair good when the other firm chooses the unfair good. Table 5 reports the results for the behavior of the buyers. Specification (1) models the individual decisions about which good to buy (if any). The dependent variable takes value 1 if the consumer decides to buy the fair good or not to buy at all. Both decisions imply that the third party do not suffer the negative externality. 23 The share of transactions where consumers decide to avoid the externality is stable over time. In addition, the more participants care about the third party the more likely they are to avoid the externality buying the fair good or not buying at all (p=0.000). Finally, CSR coordination does not affect the probability that a consumer avoids the negative externality. Specification (2) in Table 5 restricts the analysis to observations where the consumer receives offers for both types of good. The dependent variable here takes value 1 if the consumer buys the fair good and 0 if she buys the unfair good. 24 Consistently with (1), there is a positive effect of Gamma on the choice of avoiding the externality. Again, there is no treatment effect on the type of good purchased. Finally, an increase in the price difference between the fair and the unfair good decreases the probability of buying the fair good (p=0.000).
Specification (3) shows that the price participants pay for the fair good does not significantly depend on their third-party preferences. The price paid for the fair good is not affected by Gamma nor by the coordination possibilities of firms. Moreover, on average, the price paid for the fair good increases by 3.08 units when consumers face asymmetric offers. Finally, the fact that firms reach an agreement does not affect the prices that consumers pay for the fair good. 25
Result 6. In the role of consumer, the more a participant cares about the third party, the more likely she is to avoid the externality either by buying the fair good if one is offered or by not buying at all.

Does market interaction erode socially responsible behavior?
In this subsection, we address the question whether market interaction erodes socially responsible behavior. We do so by checking to what extent participants' choices in the role of consumer in part 2 are consistent with their third-party preferences measured in part 1. As the choice between two fair goods is unaffected by a consumer's third-party preference, we restrict our attention to instances in which consumers are offered both types of good or only unfair goods. 26 Excluding all participants who did not exhibit consistent third-party preferences in part 1 leaves us with 376 observations. In the case of asymmetric offers, buying the For the case of symmetric offers of the unfair good, consumers can only avoid the externality if they decide not to buy any good. Not buying would be consistent with their third-party preferences if, and only if, 80 , where is the lower price among the two unfair goods offered. We call participants' decision in the market 'socially responsible' if either they buy the fair good or if they do not buy the unfair good when being offer two unfair goods. To obtain a conservative prediction of a participant's socially responsible actions, we assume that an individual participant's is the minimum value in the interval in which lays according to the choices made in part 1 of the experiment. Table 6 reports the frequency of all combinations of predicted and actual decisions made by consumers. Third-party preferences revealed in part 1 of the experiment predict a share of 45.21% of social responsible decisions. The externality was avoided in 45.21% of the market interactions where consumers could choose whether to avoid the harm to the third party. Obviously, there is no significant difference between these shares (Wilcoxon signed rank test 26 For the case of symmetric fair offers the consumer has no choice. She is forced to choose a socially responsible behavior. 27 Since the price of the fair good was never more than 80, not buying any good is irrational given the utility function displayed in Eq. (7). This happened in only 10 instances. The prediction from third-party preferences in these cases was to buy the fair good. Since the effect on the third party is the same with both decisions, we decided to exclude these observations in our analysis.
p=1.000). Consumers behaved in line with their third-party preferences in the vast majority of the cases (78.72%). In 10.64% of the cases, participant decisions were not socially responsible in contrast with the prediction based on their third-party preferences. In the remaining 10.64% of the cases, consumer decisions were socially responsible when third-party preferences did not predict such behavior. In conclusion, we find no evidence that our market setting erodes socially responsible behavior.
Result 7. Market interaction does not erode socially responsible behavior.
Experiment 2: Carbon Emission Compensation Certificates
In Experiment 1, we used a framework where the negative externality is imposed on only one person. In many market settings, externalities are more diffused than that in the sense that they have a small impact on many people, like carbon emission. We ran a second experiment to check the robustness of the findings in the previous section with a different subject pool in a setting where externalities are arguably more diffused. In particular does Experiment 2 allows us to test robustness of the baseline results to a shift in third-party preferences because the participants in Experiment 2 care less about the diffused externality than that the participants in Experiment 1 care about the externality imposed on one person in the lab (see Figure 3) . We expect that this does not alter our qualitative findings.
Design and procedures Experiment 2
Experiment 2 makes use of the same experimental design as Experiment 1 with the exception that the third party is now outside the lab. In particular, in part 2, we informed the participants that we would buy €7 worth of carbon emission compensation certificates from a charity called Carbonfund.org when the fair good (or no good) was traded. In case the unfair good was traded, we would not buy any carbon emission compensation certificates. Similarly, in part 1, the payoffs for the receiver would be donated to Carbonfund.org. In the instructions, we gave the following details about the charity: "CarbonFund.org is an organization that allows individuals to offset their carbon footprint, which includes the emissions from their homes, cars, and air travel. In particular, for every 10 francs retained for CarbonFund.org, we will donate 1 euro to CarbonFund.org, which allows offsetting about 110 kg of CO2." To enhance the credibility of our commitment to donate to CarbonFund.org, we announced in the instructions that we would publicly donate the total amount raised in the session at the end of it.
A total of 96 participants were recruited from the general student population of the University of Amsterdam. The participants were equally split over the COORDINATION and NO COORDINATION treatments resulting in 8 matching groups per treatment. The average earnings were €16.98, including a show-up fee of €7.50, with a minimum of €14.50 and a maximum of €22.40. We donated €84 to CarbonFund.org.
Results Experiment 2
This section contains the results of Experiment 2. We highlight differences between the findings between Experiments 1 and 2 by only indicating where they differ in the numbered result summaries. We add an apostrophe to the corresponding result of Experiment 1. Before we discuss the results, we wish to highlight a marked difference between the two experiments (and Experiment 3). Figure 3 clearly shows that third-party preferences are weaker in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. In fact, the empirical distribution of third-party preferences in Experiments 1 and 3 first-order stochastically dominate the one in Experiment 2. The difference is statistically significant (two-sample combined Kolomogorov-Schmorinov test, p=0.023). As the experiments differ in two dimensions (the nature of the externality and the distribution of third-party preferences), we cannot attribute observed differences to one or the other change.
As it turns out, the two experiments qualitatively yield the same main results. 
The effect of coordination on aggregate market outcomes
The fraction of fair goods traded per treatment is displayed in Table 7 , second column, and its evolution over time in Figure 4 , panel a. As in Experiment 1, the introduction of coordination possibilities does not significantly affect the share of fair goods traded (p=0.875).
28
On the other hand, the fraction of fair goods traded is significantly lower than in Experiment 1 (p=0.001). In only about 1/3 of the cases, the fair good was traded, while this happened in almost 2/3 of the cases in Experiment 1. Participants seem to care more about the negative externality when the harm is concentrated in one person in the lab than in the more diffused externality caused by carbon emission. Like in Experiment 1, participants tend to coordinated more on symmetric offers if they have the opportunity to coordinate although the difference is not statistically significant in Experiment 2 (p=0.155). 29 Figure 4 , panels b-d, shed light on why this may be the case: behavior in the COORDINATION treatment is much more noisy than in Experiment 1.
Result 2'. In Experiment 2, the share of symmetric offers is not significantly higher when firms can coordinate on the type of good that they offer to consumers.
The most interesting departure from our results from Experiment 1 is that the price for the fair good decreases when coordination possibilities are introduced. When firms can coordinate on the type of good that they offer, market price for the fair good is, on average, 6.6 units lower (p=0.059). This pattern is clearly seen in Figure 5 , panel a, and in the econometric analysis using model (5) reported in Table 8 . As in Experiment 1, the price for the unfair good is not significantly different when coordination possibilities are introduced (p=0.674). We can safely reject the hypothesis that coordination possibilities are conducive to price collusion. 30 Like in Experiment 1, we do not find that the firms' ability to coordinate has a significant impact on consumer surplus or producer surplus. 31
Figure 5: Evolution of the prices of the fair and the unfair goods in Experiment 2
Notes: Solid and dashed lines refer to the NO COORDINATION and COORDINATION treatments respectively.
28 Similarly, there are no significant differences in the share of unfair goods traded nor in the likelihood that the transaction does not occur. 29 68% of the offers made in the coordination stage are symmetric (27% fair/fair and 40% unfair/unfair). Unfair/unfair offers are more likely to be accepted than asymmetric offers (79% vs. 56%). 56% of the fair/fair offers are accepted. 30 We find no significant differences in consumer and firm surplus between treatments (p=0.294 and p=0.401) 31 Consumer surplus, based on the third-party preferences measured in part 1 of the experiment, equals 133.52 [133.49] Table 9 reports regressions explaining firms' behavior in Experiment 2. Consistently with Experiment 1, the stronger participants' third-party preferences, the more likely they are to offer the fair good. Like in Experiment 1, we find no significant treatment effect on the type of good offered. The ability of firms to coordinate does not affect the likelihood of offering the fair good. Again, we observe no significant relation between third-party preferences and the price at which the fair good is offered. Three main divergences from experiment 1 can be noticed. First, reaching an agreement in the COORDINATION treatment does not increase the probability of offering the fair good nor its offered price. The likely reason in that the fraction of symmetric fair offers in the COORDINATION treatment is lower than in Experiment 1 (p=0.030). Second, the price offered for the fair good is, on average, significantly lower when coordination between firms is possible. Finally, the price offered for the fair good is not sensitive to the type of offers that consumers face. Notes: The dependent variable in (1) takes value 1 if the fair or no good is bought. The dependent variable in (2) takes value 1 if the fair good is bought and 0 otherwise. PricediffFU is the difference in prices between the fair and unfair good when consumer faces an asymmetric offer. Period takes values from 1 to 24. Coordination takes value 1 for the COORDINATION treatment. Asymmetric takes value 1 if the consumer faces different type of goods in a certain round. Agreement in (4) takes value 1 if firms reach an agreement in the COORDINATION treatment. Robust standard errors clustered by group in parenthesis. Observations where participants revealed inconsistent third-party preferences are excluded. *p<0.1. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01. Table 10 contains the results for consumer behavior in Experiment 2. Consistently with Experiment 1, the more participants care about the third party, the more likely they are to avoid the externality when acting as consumers. Again, the ability of firms to coordinate does not affect the probability that the consumer avoids the externality. The main divergence, again, is that the introduction of coordination possibilities causes a decrease on the price for the fair product paid by the consumers.
Firms' and consumers' individual behavior
Result 5'. In Experiment 2, firms do not offer a higher price for the fair good when the other firm chooses the unfair good.
Does market interaction erode socially responsible behavior?
To what extent are participants' choices in the role of consumer in part 2 consistent with their third-party preferences measured in part 1? Mirroring Table 6, Table 11 reports the frequency of all combinations of predicted and actual decisions made by consumers. Consumers behaved accordingly to their third-party preferences in most of the selected observations (89.54%). We observe that our market setting eroded socially responsible behavior of consumers in 7.20% of the cases. In contrast, consumers internalized the externality when it was not predicted by third-party preferences at most in 3.26% of the observations. On the aggregate, consumers avoided the externality in 20.93% of the relevant market interactions, which is less than the predicted 24.87% (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p=0.009). So, in contrast to Experiment 1, market interaction erodes social responsibility to some extent in Experiment 2.
Result 7'. In Experiment 2, market interaction erodes socially responsible behavior. Notes: The predicted choice is based on the lowerbound of the third-party preference measured in part 1. Underlined [bold] entries correspond to observations where participant decisions were [not] socially responsible in contrast with the predicted choice.
Experiment 3: Alternative coordination mechanism
In the theory section, we argued that under some conditions, the firms could coordinate on the kind of goods offered using a simpler coordination mechanism than the one studied in Experiments 1 and 2. The purpose of Experiment 3 is to test the robustness of the results obtained in the first two experiments regarding the coordination mechanism. In Experiment 3, we employ the same framework as in Experiment 1, with the exception that the firms interacted in a coordination mechanism that only allows firms to coordinate on both offering the fair good. It is this type of coordination that might justify an exemption from the cartel laws. We expect the same main results.
Design and procedures Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we employ the same two-treatment design as in Experiment 1. The experiments only differ in terms of the coordination stage. In particular, in the COORDINATION treatment, the two firms interact in a one-stage coordinating mechanism in which both independently vote whether or not to both sell the fair good. If both vote in favor, each offers the fair good to the buyer. If one or two firms votes against it, both firms choose the type of good independently (first stage of the market game.) In that case, the firms only learn about the kind of good offered by the other firm after both have made their choices regarding the kind of good.
We recruited students of the same mandatory Economics course in the UvA's PPLE bachelor as in Experiment 1, albeit one year later. 136 students participated, 72 in treatment COORDINATION and 64 in treatment NO COORDINATION, resulting in 9 and 8 matching groups per treatment respectively. Participants did not receive a show-up fee. They earned on average €7.90 with a minimum of €0 and a maximum of €13.60.
Results Experiment 3
In this section, we discuss the results of Experiment 3. Again, we pay special attention to the results that diverge from our findings in Experiment 1. Before we present the results, we note that the distributions of third-party preferences, plotted in Figure 3 , do not differ significantly between Experiments 1 and 3 (two-sample combined Kolmogorov-Schmirnov test, p=0.808).
Any differences between the two experiments can hence be directly attributed to the differences in the coordination mechanism used. Table 12 presents the aggregate outcomes of Experiment 3. Figure 6 plots the share of fair goods traded and offers over time, and Table 13 presents Logit and OLS regressions of type of goods traded, type of good offered, and market prices. As in Experiment 1, the introduction of coordination possibilities does not affect the share of fair goods traded (p=0.531). Similarly, there are no significant differences in the share of unfair goods traded nor in the likelihood that the transaction does not occur. The share of fair goods traded is not significantly different across both coordination mechanism (p=1.000). In relation to the type of offers made by firms, in consonance with Experiment 1, firms tend to coordinate more on symmetric than on asymmetric offers when introducing coordination possibilities (p=0.023). 32 The share of symmetric fair, symmetric unfair and asymmetric offers is also not significantly different across both coordination mechanisms (p=0.823, p=0.679, and p=0.437 respectively). Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 32 64% of the firms votes in favor of fair/fair; in 42% of the markets both firms did so. While firms are less likely to reach an agreement in the Experiment 3's coordination mechanisms than in Experiment 1's, 33 also in Experiment 3, the introduction of coordination possibilities does not affect prices for the fair nor the unfair good (p=0.847 and p=0.847 respectively). Again, we find that the firms' ability to coordinate has no significant impact on either consumer surplus or producer surplus. 34 Table 14 includes regressions explaining firms' behavior in Experiment 3. Consistently with Experiment 1, the more participants care about the third party, the more likely they are to offer the fair good when acting as a firm. The absence of treatment effect on the type of good offered is also present in Experiment 3: The ability of firms to coordinate does not affect the likelihood of offering the fair good. Two main divergences from Experiment 1 can be noticed. First, reaching an agreement in the COORDINATION treatment does not increase the offered price for the fair good. Second, firms do not offer higher prices for the fair good in the case of asymmetric offers.
The effect of coordination on aggregate market outcomes
Firms' and consumers' individual behavior
Result 5''. In Experiment 3, firms do not offer a higher price for the fair good when the other firm chooses the unfair good. Table 15 reports the results for the behavior of the buyers in Experiment 3. Consistently with Experiment 1, the more participants care about the third party, the more likely they are to avoid the externality when acting as consumers. Again, the ability of firms to coordinate does not affect the probability that the consumer avoids the externality and third-party preferences do not affect the price paid for the fair good. The only difference between experiments is that consumers do not pay significantly more for the fair good when facing asymmetric offers. Table 16 reports the frequency of all combinations of predicted and actual decisions made by consumers. Consumers behaved according to their third-party preferences in most of the selected observations (76.88%). We observe that market interaction eroded socially responsible behavior of consumers in 14.55% of the selected observations. In contrast, consumers internalized the externality when it was not predicted by third-party preferences in 8.57% of the market interactions. Third-party preferences revealed in part 1 of the experiment predict a share of at least 52.21% of social responsible decisions when they had the option to choose. The externality was avoided in 46.23% of the market interactions where consumers could choose whether to avoid the harm to the third party. In line with Experiment 1, these shares do not differ significantly (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p=0.201).
Does market interaction erode socially responsible behavior?
Conclusion
In an experiment designed to study corporate social responsibility, based on Bartling et al. (2015) , we find that allowing firms to coordinate on the type of good they sell has no significant effect on the fraction of fair goods traded on the market. Firms do reduce product variety by coordinating on offering more the same type of good (fair or unfair). Consumer surplus and producer surplus are not significantly affected by the opportunity to coordinate. We find that participants' choices in Yang et al.'s (2016) social-preferences test are a powerful driver of our results. Consistently with the theory, the reduction in product variety is explained by the strength of consumers' preferences for the fair good and the firms' internalization of the negative externality. At the individual level, we find that participants' social preferences predict their behavior in the roles of both consumer and firm. Consumers are more likely to avoid the negative externality the stronger their third-party preferences are. The more firms care about the third party, the more likely they are to offer the fair good. Firms having strong third-party preferences tend to coordinate on both offering the fair good. Otherwise, allowing them the opportunity to coordinate on product quality leads to less CSR.
We ran Experiments 2 and 3 to test the robustness of the baseline results obtained in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, we vary the distribution of the third-party preferences parameter using a diffused negative externality. In Experiment 3, the firms are only allowed to coordinate on the fair good, to test whether the coordination mechanism matters crucially. are robust to variations in the experimental design explored in Experiments 2 and 3. In both experiments, the main results from Experiment 1 are corroborated.
Our finding that social preferences are a powerful predictor for CSR is in line with empirical tests of the 'upper echelons perspective' from the business literature (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) . For example, Agle et al. (1999) observe significant relationships between CEO values and corporate social performance. Chin et al. (2013) report that firms with liberal CEOs exhibit greater advances in CSR than firms with conservative CEOs. Marquis and Lee (2013) find that the presence of female senior managers positively affects corporate philanthropic contributions. Filistrucchi and Prüfer (2019) identify differences in strategic decisions between Catholic and Protestant nonprofit hospitals. All in all, our experimental results suggest that managerial values are a more important driver of CSR than opportunities for firms to coordinate their CSR activities.
We warn not to draw strong conclusions regarding competition policy on the basis of our experimental results. On average, allowing firms to coordinate their CSR activities has no impact on fair production. This may suggest a lenient approach by competition authorities regarding CSR coordination, in particular for cases where the firms' managers can credibly signal their managerial values towards CSR. Our experimental results suggest that a potential risk of such approach is some firms coordinating on less CSR than they otherwise would. A case in point is perhaps the lightbulb producers in the 1920s agreeing on all offering less sustainable lightbulbs.
Moreover, CSR coordination may allow firms to collude on other dimensions, including on higher prices, lower quality, less production capacity, or less R&D, to the detriment of welfare. Future experiments in which firms are allowed to coordinate on such dimension may shed light on this.
Appendix: Properties of the market game and the extended market game
This appendix contains the theoretical analysis of the market game and the extended market game. Throughout the appendix, we only consider equilibria in weakly undominated strategies. In Section A.1, we consider equilibrium pricing by the firms. Section A.2 includes results under the assumption that neither firm internalizes the negative externality. In Section A.3, this assumption is relaxed.
A.1 Equilibrium pricing
We start by considering the firms' best responses in the price stage. In the case that both firms offer the same good, the Bertrand logic applies resulting in (close to) marginal-cost pricing in equilibrium. If the firms offer a different good, the one selling the unfair good solves ∈ 2
(1)
when best responding to the other firm choosing a price ∈ , 2 . Notice that the best-response price is increasing in . The firm selling the fair good solves ∈ 2 (2) for ∈ , . So, the best-response price by the firms offering the fair good is decreasing in .
A.2 Firms do not internalize the negative externality
We first derive results under the assumption that neither firm internalizes the negative externality, i.e., 0, 1,2. 
respectively.
Proof. We solve the game using backward induction. Assume. for the moment. that both the fair and the unfair goods are offered at 'moderate' prices so that consumers always buy a good and that some buy the fair good and some buy the unfair good (it is readily verified that the equilibrium prices satisfy those assumptions). The equilibrium prices follow from Bertrand logic if both firms offer the same good and from the best responses (1) and (2) if the firms offer different products.
The firms' resulting profits are This game has a unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which a firm chooses the fair good with probability ≡ .∎ Obviously, the market game has asymmetric equilibria as well, in which the two firms produce different kinds of goods. The firms might have to coordinate to reach such equilibrium outcome. The extended market game implements the asymmetric equilibrium of the market game as the following proposition shows. What is the effect of firms coordinating on an asymmetric equilibrium relative to the symmetric equilibrium? First note that the probability that the fair good is traded may or may not increase when firms can coordinate in this way as the following two examples show.
Example 1. Suppose . If both the fair and the unfair good are offered to the market, in equilibrium, of the consumers buys the fair good. In the asymmetric equilibrium, . The probability that the fair good is traded equals 2 1 . So, in the symmetric equilibrium, the fair good is traded more frequently.
Example 2. Suppose that . If both the fair and the unfair good are offered to the market, in equilibrium, of the consumers buy the fair good. In the asymmetric equilibrium,
. The probability that the fair good is traded equals 2 1 . So, in the symmetric equilibrium, the fair good is traded less frequently.
The welfare consequences of coordination on an asymmetric equilibrium compared to the symmetric equilibrium are ambiguous too according to the following propositions. where the latter equation follows from the assumption that . However.
when the firms sells at a price . it incurs costs and forgoes the positive externality so that it is strictly better off letting the other firm sell the fair good. It is readily verified that 1 so that there is indeed a non-empty set of parameters for which the equilibrium exists.∎ The extended market game has an equilibrium in which firms make the following offers, regardless of being the first or the second mover: 
